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CHAPTER 16 
State and Local Taxation 
OLIVER OLDMAN 
A. SUMMARY 
§16.1. State tax developments. There were few notable develop-
ments in taxation in Massachusetts during the 1961 SURVEY year. The 
only development to which more than a few sentences are devoted in 
this SURVEY year's tax chapter is the Atlantic Refining case, which per-
mitted the town of Newton to apply its property tax to state-owned 
propery located along Route 128 and leased to Atlantic Refining Com-
pany. The case is discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
Guy J. Rizzotto, former head of the Inheritance Tax Bureau, be-
came Chairman of the State Tax Commission and Commissioner of 
Corporations and Tax-ation in March, 1961. In January, 1961 the State 
Tax Commission, then under the chairmanship of Robert T. Capeless, 
submitted to the General Court the 40-page Special Report of the State 
Tax Commission Relative to the Advisability of a More Simplified 
and Equitable Corporation Income Tax. The report was printed as 
Senate Document No. 512 and was prepared pursuant to Chapter 103 
of the Resolves of 1960. It is briefly discussed below. Copies are 
available from the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. Reported 
cases and other pronouncements are discussed below in the sections on 
corporate taxes and personal income tax. Only a few of the numerous 
statutory changes in state taxation during the 1961 SURVEY year are 
discussed below. An enumeration and brief summary of these changes 
appears at pages 9975 through 9982 of 2 CCH Massachusetts State Tax 
Reporter. Also, a 22-page mimeographed explanation of these 
changes, prepared by John Dane, Jr., is available from the Greater 
Boston Chamber of Commerce. 
§16.2. Local tax developments. In May, 1961, the Greater Boston 
Economic Study Committee, which is an Associate Center of the Com-
mittee for Economic Development, published a 40-page study en-
titled Financing Local Government in the 1960's: A Policy Statement 
OLIVER OLDMAN is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Director of 
Training of its International Program in Taxation. During the fall of 1960 he was 
one of the members of the State Tax Commission's Advisory Committee on making 
the Massachusetts corporation excise tax more simple and equitable. 
The author is happy to acknowledge the considerable assistance provided by 
Ernest T. Smith, of the Board of Student Editors. 
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on Fiscal Reform in Massachusetts. The timeliness of this study be-
came only too apparent in the hubbubl over the Bettigole2 case, which 
requires assessment of property at 100 percent of fair cash value. That 
case is not discussed below because it was decided after the end of the 
1961 SURVEY year. There was no judicial development with respect 
to the Prudential Back Bay center. However, Prudential's application 
under the revised Urban Redevelopment Law was submitted during 
the year and litigation was instituted in order to test the legality of 
the project under the revised law.S The Supreme Judicial Court's 
decision approving the project was handed down just as this chapter 
of the 1961 SURVEY was completed.4 Legislation on local taxes during 
the year related mainly to minor exemptions and procedural prob-
lems. It is summarized at pages 9977 through 9979 of 2 CCH Massa-
chusetts State Tax Reporter. Virtually all reported cases dealing with 
property taxes are noted below. One, the Atlantic case, is discussed 
at length. 
B. PERSONAL INCOME TAX 
§16.3. General. In March, 1961, the constitutional amendment au-
thorizing the imposition of a graduated income tax was approved by 
a joint session of the House and Senate for the second time. The 
amendment will therefore appear on the ballot at the November, 1962, 
election. By Chapter 57 of the Resolves of 1961 the General Court 
asked the State Tax Commission to make a study of correlating Massa-
chusetts taxation of partnerships with federal practice with respect to 
replacing the income tax presently levied against the partnership with 
a tax levied against its members. The Commission is to report by the 
end of January, 1962. A Technical Discussion of 1960 Personal In-
come Tax Legislation was presented by Commissioner Capeless in 
December, 1960, and is reprinted a1 ~200-119 of 1 CCH Massachusetts 
State Tax Reporter. 
§16.4. Strike benefits. Benefits paid to strikers out of a union strike 
fund are not taxable business income, according to a letter from the 
Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, reprinted in part at 
~ 15-408.25 of 1 CCH Massachusetts State Tax Reporter. In view of 
the fact that union dues paid by employees are deductible in com-
puting business income, it would seem questionable to exclude from 
such income any eventual return of these dues in the form of strike 
benefits, especially when the only rationale offered is that the strike 
benefits are "in the nature of a gift." However, the treatment accorded 
strike benefits is at least parallel to that accorded social security, pay-
§16.2. 1 See front page of any Boston newspaper for November 21, 1961, and days 
immediately thereafter. 
2 Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1299, 178 N.E.2d 10, 
1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. 1[200-131 (Nov. 20, 1961). 
S See the discussions in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §§10.2, 13.8. 
4 Dodge v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 1961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1473, 179 
N.E.2d234. 
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ments toward which are deductible and payments from which are now 
excludable from income.! 
§16.5. "Negative" tax. In a unique case decided by the Supreme 
Judicial Court during the 1961 SURVEY year the taxpayer, appearing 
pro se, computed a minus or negative tax at the business income rate 
on her net loss in the business income category.l She sought to credit 
this against the tax due on account of income from gains and from 
dividends and interest. The Court, finding the Massachusetts personal 
income tax to be a series of separate taxes and finding no statutory 
warrant for the credit, denied her the credit. The case points up a 
weakness in Massachusetts tax law; virtually all the other income tax 
states have at least some means of offsetting current business losses 
against other current income. Also, the case is reminiscent of former 
Chief Judge Magruder's well-known concurring opinion which dis-
cusses the subject of negative basis.2 
§16.6. Charitable exemption. The undistributed income of a trust 
whose principal and accumulations were to be distributed upon 
termination to unspecified charitable, educational, or religious organ-
izations was held exempt from income tax, since the funds would 
ultimately reach a charitable destination.1 
§16.7. Out-of-state income from business and from isolated sale. 
The taxpayer's interest in standing timber in Maine was managed for 
him and others through a power of attorney given to an operator resi-
dent in Maine. The taxpayer's income from the Maine timber was 
held taxable as income from a trade or business, against his contention 
that the tax was an unconstitutional property tax on foreign real 
estate.! The taxpayer also had income from the sale of his interest in 
inherited Maine real estate, an isolated or casual sale. The court held 
it was not the purpose of the 1954 amendment to Section 6 of Chapter 
62 to tax income from isolated or casual sales of real estate, a decision 
of doubtful value as a precedent in view of amendments made to 
Section 6 since 1954. 
C. CORPORATION EXCISE TAX 
§16.8. State Tax Commission's special report. This report, which 
is referred to at the beginning of this chapter, analyzed four different 
§16.4. 1 State Tax Commission v. Gray, 340 Mass. 535, 163 N.E.2d 404 (1960). 
See discussion of this case in 1960 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §17.2. 
§16.5. 1 Wolcott v. State Tax Commission, 341 Mass. 409, 169 N.E.2d 860 (1960). 
2 Parker v. Delaney, 186 F.2d 455, 459 (1st Cir. 1950). See also Surrey and Warren, 
Federal Income Taxation 645 (1960). 
§16.6. 1 Hinkle, Trustee v. State Tax Commission, A.T.B. Docket No. 35258, I 
CCH Mass. Tax Cas. ~200·116 (Sept. 28,1960). 
§16.7. 1 Wheatland v. State Tax Commission, A.T.B. Docket Nos. 33834-33837, 
I CCH Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-122 (Nov. 16, 1960), appeal pending. 
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plans for simplifying the corporation excise tax applicable to business 
and manufacturing corporations and for making it more equitable.1 
The Commission recommended first that the present tax be replaced 
either by (1) a tax measured by net income only (the rate to be 8 per-
cent plus 23 percent surtax, thus preserving present revenue from the 
corporate excise), or by (2) a tax measured in part by net income (the 
present rate of 5i percent plus 23 percent surtax) and in part by 
tangible property not subject to local taxation (at a rate of $7.44 per 
thousand plus 23 percent surtax). Secondly, the Commission recom-
mended that the alternative measures of the minimum tax to be paid 
be based on gross receipts or a flat sum of up to $50. The General 
Court after consideration of the report approved Chapter 65 of the 
Resolves of 1961, which asks the Commission to continue its study but 
to limit the study to the second recommendation above and to the 
second part of the first recommendation above. The Commission is to 
report at the end of January, 1962. 
§16.9. Interpretation. Regulations have still not been issued nor 
were any rulings concerning corporation excise tax issued during the 
1961 SURVEY year. In December, 1960, Commissioner Cape less did, 
however, issue a Technical Discussion of 1960 Corporation Excise Tax 
Legislation, which is reprinted at ~200-118 of 1 CCH Massachusetts 
State Tax Reporter. Also, at ~200-126, a speech by Owen L. Clarke, 
Chief of the Bureau of Corporations, is reprinted, which provides the 
bureau's interpretation of many aspects of the corporation excise tax. 
Finally, at ~13-905.30 is a bureau letter which, in stating bureau policy 
on debts due stockholders, refers to a 1958 tentative regulation on 
computation of corporate excess. 
§16.10. Allocation factors. Chapter 419 of the Acts of 1961 added 
a sentence to Section 38(3) of G.L., c. 63, in order to eliminate from 
three-factor formula allocations any factor the denominator (total pay-
roll, total receipts, or total property) of which is less than 10 percent 
of the part of net income to be apportioned by that factor. Thus, 
when three factors are being used, if one third of the corporation's 
net income subject to allocation is greater than ten times the total 
amount of the corporation's property, the property factor could not be 
used. Similarly, when two factors are being used, if one half of the 
corporation's net income subject to allocation is greater than ten times 
the total amount of the corporation's property, the property factor 
could not be used. The effect of this statutory change is to prevent 
allocation by insignificant factors. Whether the change can be applied 
more than once in computing an allocation and whether the change 
would ever apply to the gross receipts factor are matters on which the 
department may be expected to comment at an appropriate time. 
§16.11. Corporate excess. The Appellate Tax Board has ruled that 
the market value of shares of capital stock is relevant to the determina-
tion of the "fair value" of the capital stock of a foreign corporation for 
§16.8. 1 Senate Doc. No. 512 (1961), noted in §16.l supra. 
4
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/19
§16.15 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 185 
the purposes of computing the corporate excess base of the corpora-
tion excise.1 
§16.12. Insurance companies. Two cases involving insurance com-
panies were decided during the 1961 SURVEY year. One involved the 
excise tax applicable to the value of all policies issued by a life in-
surance company. It was held that the tax was not applicable to a 
group annuity policy which was issued by the company and covered 
the company's own employees.1 The other involved the excise tax 
measured by gross premiums when some of the premiums arose from 
insuring foreign risks (Hong Kong and Surinam). It was held that 
the excise constituted neither an undue burden on interstate or foreign 
commerce nor a violation of due process.2 
D. PROPERTY TAX 
§16.13. Personal liability for real estate tax. More than six years 
after the assessment of real estate taxes, the city of Boston sought to 
collect those taxes in a suit based on the owner's personal liability for 
the taxes. The six-year statute of limitations in Section 2 of G.L., 
c. 260, was held to bar recovery in personam, even though liens 
for such taxes, otherwise valid, might be enforced against the real 
estate.1 The Supreme Judicial Court also held, with respect to the 
same parcel of real estate but a subsequent owner, that the city's fore-
closure of tax title within six years did not bar recovery in personam 
as to amounts in excess of fair market value at the date of fore-
closure. 
§16.14. Tax lien vs. United States-owned mortgage. After the 
United States Government through the Reconstruction Finance Cor-
poration had acquired a mortgage lien against real property in the 
city of Springfield, the city acquired tax liens for unpaid property 
tax. The mortgage was subsequently foreclosed by the Federal 
Government. The United States District Court held that the city's 
tax liens were nevertheless valid.! 
§16.15. Proof of mailing of tax bill. The city of Boston's challenge 
to the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tax Board based upon the late 
filing of an application for abatement was supported by proof that 
the tax bill was prepared, addressed, enveloped, and placed in a mail 
sack which was put in a vestibule of the tax office to await pickup 
§16.11. 1 Sears Roebuck Co. v. State Tax Commission, A.T.B. Docket No. 35615, 
1 CCH Mass. Tax Cas. ~200-127 Guly 27, 1961). Appeal is pending on determina-
tion of value. 
§16.l2. 1 State Tax Commission v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
341 Mass. 555, 170 N.E.2d 7II (1960). 
2 Springfield Insurance Co. v. State Tax Commission, 342 Mass. 505, 174 N.E.2d 
455 (1961). See §10.6 supra for further comment on this case. 
§16.l3. 1 City of Boston v. Gordon, 342 Mass. 586, 175 N .E.2d 377 (1961). 
§16.l4 1 United States v. City of Springfield, 190 F. Supp. 817 (D. Mass. 1961). 
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by the post office. . Because no proof was offered that the sack was 
picked up on that same day, the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
the city had not proved mailing on that day.1 
E. THE ATLANTIC REFINING CASE 
§16.16. Municipal taxation of state-owned land: Lease to private 
operator. In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Assessors of Newton1 the Su-
preme Judicial Court held that the city of Newton could tax to the 
company a parcel of real estate owned by the state along Route 128 
and leased to the company for gas station and restaurant purposes. 
The land had been acquired by the state prior to 1953 by a statutory 
taking.2 In 1953 it was leased to Atlantic for twenty-five years.3 
Rental payments were based upon cents per gallon, percentages of 
restaurant sales, and similar methods of varying payment with condi-
tions. Atlantic was to build certain kinds of buildings, title to which 
vested in the state. Taxes on Atlantic's personal property were to 
be paid by Atlantic. The lease makes no mention of other taxes. 
Subleasing of restaurant functions to Howard D. Johnson Company 
was permitted. The lease covered not only the particular parcel in-
volved in this suit but all the other similar ones leased by the state 
to Atlantic along Route 128, with different payments required for 
different locations. Atlantic was required to furnish certain free 
services for the traveling public, such as "touring information, water 
for radiators and batteries, cleaning of windshields . . . [and] . . . 
toilets," as well as all services and equipment necessary for safe opera-
tion of motor vehicles. Retail prices of gasoline and oil were not to 
exceed prices prevailing in the vicinity of each station. Within a 
radius of three miles of the locus there were about a dozen gas sta-
tions of other companies, though none of these was on Route 128.4 
Atlantic's customers were in part the traveling public and in part 
nurses and others from the nearby Newton-Wellesley Hospital and 
the industrial plants along or near Route 128.5 
Section 5 of G.L., c. 59, contains an enumeration of types of 
property exempt from taxation. The second item mentioned is state-
owned property, subject to several exceptions, including that provided 
in Section 3A of the same chapter. Section 3A eliminates the ex-
emption of state-owned real estate "if used or occupied for other 
than public purposes" and provides that such property shall be taxed 
§16.15. 1 Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Assessors of Boston, !l41 Mass. 51!l, 170 
N.E.2d 687 (1960). 
§16.l6. 1!142 Mass. 200,172 N.E.2d 827 (1961). 
2 G.L., c. 81, §7C. Cf. discussion of "public purpose" aspects of a taking for a 
highway gas station or restaurant in Opinion of the Justices, SSO Mass. 71S, 11S 
N.E.2d 452 (195S). 
3 The lease is reproduced in the Record, pp. SS·47. 
4 Record, p. 257. 
Ii Id., pp. 257·261. 
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to the state's lessee or to the user or occupant as if a holder in fee. 
Was Atlantic using the state's Route 128 property for other than 
public purposes? The Supreme Judicial Court's "yes" answer was 
based largely upon the fact that Atlantic conducted its business for 
its own private profit in virtually the same manner as it did for its 
gas stations on land not owned by the state, and also upon the decision 
in Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. Gloucester)6 which held 
that the state's sublessee engaged in manufacturing fish by-products on 
a portion of a state-owned pier was subject to the city of Gloucester's 
property tax. 
In construing "public purpose" in the context of exemption of 
state-owned property from local property taxes, it is appropriate to 
examine the interests of those possibly affected by the result of this 
case: Atlantic, the municipality (six towns and one city filed a brief 
as amici curiae), the state (intervener in the case), and possibly other 
business firms.7 
The interests of Atlantic may be considered both from the point 
of view of the lease actually involved in the case and from the point 
of view of Atlantic's entering into a new lease of state-owned premises 
under similar circumstances. In the actual circumstances, the issue 
of taxability first arose8 after the lease had been executed and the 
rental payments agreed upon, but was not resolved until after the 
law had become quite certain on the further issue as to whether 
it was the lessor or the lessee who was to bear the burden of any tax 
liability ultimately found. The lease itself, executed in 1953, con-
tained no provision relating to local real estate taxes, and at that 
time Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Assessors of Gloucester 9 
had not yet been decided. 
The Assessors of Gloucester case, which examines the history of 
Section 15 of G.L., c. 59, concluded that even though Section 3A 
made the company liable for property tax on the portion of the state-
owned pier subleased to the company, it could obtain tax reimburse-
ment from its lessor. The decision was based upon a 1907 precedent 10 
which the Court was reluctant to overrule. If the Supreme Judicial 
Court struggled with the applicability of Section 15 in the Gloucester 
6334 Mass. 287, 135 N.E.2d 20 (1956), noted in 1956 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §11.4. 
7 The history of Section 3A is examined in Gloucester Ice &: Cold Storage Co. v. 
Assessors of Gloucester, 337 Mass. 23, 147 N.E.2d 820 (1958). See also Nichols, Taxa-
tion in Massachusetts 234-238, 260-262 (3d ed. 1938). As far as state-owned land is 
concerned, Section 3A came into being in 1951. However, there have been other 
statutes under which state-owned lands used for private purposes have been subject 
to local taxation. See, e.g., Acts of 1904, c. 385, §1; Boston Fish Market Corp. v. 
Boston, 224 Mass. 31,112 N.E. 616 (1916). 
8 Atlantic, upon assessment by the city of Newton, protested the tax and sought 
abatement beginning in 1956. See pages 5·7 of Reservation and Report in Case 
No. 12143 in Records and Briefs on Appeal, Atlantic Refining Co. v. Common-
wealth, 339 Mass. 12, 157 N.E.2d 868 (1959). 
9337 Mass. 23,147 N.E.2d 820 (1958). 
10 Boston Molasses Co. v. Commonwealth, 193 Mass. 387, 79 N.E. 827 (1907) 
(Louis D. Brandeis, counsel for the company). 
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case in 1958, no doubt the lawyers involved in the negotiation of the 
1953 Atlantic lease did so too. The manner in which the struggle 
was resolved does not appear in the record of the Atlantic Refining 
case; nor is it clear the extent to which the rental payments provided 
in the lease reflect the possibility that Atlantic might ultimately have 
had to bear some tax liability. However, it is clear that, as of the 
time Atlantic's suit against the city of Newton reached the Supreme 
Judicial Court, Atlantic knew that even if it were held subject to 
tax it would be reimbursed by the state.11 Thus, at that time 
Atlantic's interest was essentially only with respect to any new lease 
on other property or renewal of the lease involved in the suit. 
Atlantic's economic position with respect to a new lease, or renewal, 
after this case may be only slightly changed by the result in the case. 
The fact that the property is subject to tax if used for gas station 
and restaurant purposes means that over-all costs are more than they 
otherwise would be. It is a complex question of real estate economics 
to determine the effect of this increase in costs. If the state in an-
nouncing competitive bidding for the lease says that its terms provide 
for reimbursement of any property tax that may be imposed on the 
real estate, then it would seem as if the bids submitted would be the 
same as if there were tax exemption. If the state sought to pass on 
the tax, presumably the bidders would lower their bids accordingly. 
Either way, the total paid by Atlantic would be essentially the same. 
The burden of the tax would be on the state (or in the case of the 
Massachusetts Turnpike, perhaps on the bondholders). While this 
effect might in principle affect the state's willingness to enter into 
such arrangements, it in fact is unlikely to do so because of the state's 
position as the only one with land available on Route 128 for gas 
station and restaurant purposes. Perhaps, however, the tax burden 
will affect the state's decision as to how many such facilities to operate 
along the route. If so, the ultimate consequent impact upon Atlantic 
and other firms becomes relevant although virtually impossible to 
determine. 
There were no briefs submitted by competitors of Atlantic or by 
any other private firm. The analysis in the preceding paragraph tends 
to indicate that their interests were too remote to be a matter of 
concern to them. Also it is not clear, if they were to submit briefs, 
for which side they would argue. 
The interest of the state is essentially how much it receives, net, 
from the rental payments. It will receive more, net, if the local gov-
ernment cannot tax. How important is it that the state receive this 
additional amount? Was this the "public purpose" meant by Sec-
tion 3A? 
The interest of the local government is in the preservation of or 
11 In Atlantic Refining Co. v. Commonwealth, !I!I9 Mass. 12, 157 N.E.2d 868 (1959), 
the Court held that the Gloucester case decision was also applicable to Atlantic's 
situation and that Atlantic could obtain reimbursement from its lessor, the state. 
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building up of its property tax base. To the extent that the services 
provided by the local government and the existence of the local gov-
ernment are both factors in the successful operation of the gas station 
and restaurant, then such a government would like to be paid. Thus, 
perhaps local fire and police services are available for Atlantic's use. 
No doubt, also, the local government services which are provided to 
many of the nearby persons and companies who constitute customers 
of Atlantic are at least of indirect benefit to Atlantic. From the local 
government's point of view, such direct and indirect services provide 
good reasons for it to be permitted to tax. One can, of course, imagine 
a location, say along a remote reach of the Massachusetts Turnpike 
or some other new highway in an unsettled area of the state, where 
a gas station and restaurant are placed almost solely for the con-
venience of travelers on the highway. Such facilities, if elaborate, 
might constitute the most valuable real property in a given town and 
yet not be serviced by the town to any significant extent, directly or 
indirectly. Is it appropriate for such a town to regard these facilities 
as part of its tax base, a part that would perhaps finance a large 
portion of the town's expenses which are not even in the most in-
direct way related to the operation of the facilities? Was it the pur-
pose of Section 3A to permit or to prevent such a town from taxing? 
Could it have been the purpose of Section 3A to prevent such a town 
from taxing, yet permit Newton to tax? 
This sketchy examination of the interests affected by the interpreta-
tion of Section 3A indicates that the significant conflict of interests 
is between the state and the municipality in which highway gas 
station and restaurant facilities are located. The statute does not 
by its terms indicate in which situations which interest shall prevail. 
Instead, the statute just provides for local taxation "if used or occupied 
for other than public purposes," and leaves it to the courts to con-
sider particular cases and to develop criteria. 
A cursory examination of what has been held to be a public pur-
pose in connection with property tax exemption of state-owned 
property reveals that restaurant 12 and fish processing activities13 have 
led to local taxation of the real estate. Also taxed was land pur-
chased as a location for a jail but rented to private persons for their 
private use.14 Uses that have resulted in tax exemption include: water 
works operated for private profit,15 parking facilities operated for 
1:2 Pittsburgh Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, 377 Pa. 
274, 105 A.2d 165 (1954) (portion of authority'S property which consisted of stores 
used as a restaurant, tailoring shop. florist shop, and the like, held taxable by city 
and county; portion used as parking garage held nontaxable even though leased to 
commercial operators for their private profit). 
13 Gloucester Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Assessors of Gloucester, 337 Mass. 23, 147 
N.E.2d 820 (1958); Dehydrating Process Co. of Gloucester v. Gloucester, 334 Mass. 
287,135 N.E.2d 20 (1956). 
14 Essex v. Assessors of Salem, 153 Mass. HI, 26 N.E. 431 (1891) (county-owned 
land). 
111 Milford Water Co. v. Hopkinton,l92 Mass. 491, 78 N.E. 451 (1906). 
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private profit,18 private urban redevelopment corporationsP and 
improvements to a private airport.18 Also tax exempt, but in Ohio, 
was a gas station and restaurant facility located in populous Cuyahoga 
County on the Ohio Turnpike.19 The question of the taxability of 
such facilities, with Ohio and Massachusetts disagreeing, seems to be 
in the gray area between public and private. The factors that make 
for black or for white are not clearly discernible. The fact of profit 
has not been decisive. The additional fact that the profit has inured 
to the benefit of private persons has been of some importance, particu-
larly in the case under discussion.20 Also relevant has been a vague 
notion as to the kinds of activities that are appropriately carried out 
by governments. Often, as with water and other utilities, the element 
of monopoly is what makes public regulation, if not public operation, 
appropriate. Abutting facilities on limited-access highways are monop-
olies of a sort, and probably it is appropriate for the state at least to 
regulate them. Thus, in the Atlantic Refining case the statute re-
quired the state to control and supervise the gas stations and restau-
rants. and the lease did limit gas prices, for example, to the prevailing 
level in the vicinity. Suppose the state decided to operate the gas 
stations and restaurants with state employees and decided to do so 
at a profit. Is this a use for other than a public purpose under Section 
3A in a state where such activities by government have previously been 
unheard of? 21 Is the question of taxing gas station and restaurant 
facilities on Route 128, with its very considerable number of access 
roads, different from the question of taxing similar facilities on the 
most recently constructed turnpikes, with their fewer access roads and 
their paths so divergent from previously existing routes? 
The primary conflict of interests in a suit such as Atlantic's is be-
tween the state and the municipality. That conflict arises in many 
contexts. One might expect, as a result of this decision, that the 
cities and towns of Massachusetts will survey their territory and seek 
to tax such state-owned property as motels, restaurants, and ticket 
counters at airports, or possibly dormitories at a university. The con-
flict between state and municipality should probably neither always 
be resolved in favor of the latter nor always in favor of the former. 
Although the court in Atlantic Refining did not deal with the con-
flict extensively in its opinion, it did highlight the conflict by devoting 
18 Cabot v. Assessors of Boston, 335 Mass. 53, 138 N.E.2d 618 (1956); Pittsburgh 
Public Parking Authority v. Board of Property Assessment, 377 Pa. 274, 105 A.2d 
165 (1954). 
11 Opinion of the Justices, 334 Mass. 760, 135 N .E.2d 665 (1956); Opinion of the 
Justices, 341 Mass. 760, 168 N.E.2d 858 (1960). 
18 Opinion of the Justices, 335 Mass. 771, 142 N.E.2d 482 (1957). 
19 Carney v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 167 Ohio St. 273, 147 N.E.2d 857 (1958). 
20 Cf. Gregg v. Commissioner of Corporations and Taxation, 330 Mass. 538, 116 
N.E.2d 146 (1953). 
21 In Mexico, where the government owns the oil monopoly, PEMEX, the ques-
tion might be easy to answer; similarly in Venezuela, where the government oper-
ates a school for waiters and cooks to staff government-owned hotels. 
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to it the final paragraph of the opinion. The final words of that 
paragraph make an appropriate conclusion for this survey of tax 
developments in Massachusetts. 
It is not unreasonable that the ultimate effect of §3A may be 
an allocation of revenues between the Commonwealth and the 
municipality. New aspects of public purpose and new public 
activities call for new adjustments between the Commonwealth, 
the municipalities, and businesses conducted on publicly owned 
land.22 
22 342 Mass. 200, 207, 172 N.E.2d 827, 831 (1961). 
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